Dynamic Multi-level Privilege Control in Behavior-based Implicit
  Authentication Systems Leveraging Mobile Devices by Yang, Yingyuan & Sun, Jinyuan Stella
Dynamic Multi-level Privilege Control in
Behavior-based Implicit Authentication Systems
Leveraging Mobile Devices
Yingyuan Yang∗, Jinyuan Stella Sun∗
∗University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37996 USA Email: {yyang57, jysun}@utk.edu
Abstract—Implicit authentication (IA) is gaining popularity
over recent years due to its use of user behavior as the main input,
relieving users from explicit actions such as remembering and
entering passwords. However, such convenience comes at a cost of
authentication accuracy and delay which we propose to improve
in this paper. Authentication accuracy deteriorates as users’
behaviors change as a result of mood, age, a change of routine,
etc. Current authentication systems handle failed authentication
attempts by locking the user out of her mobile device. It is
unsuitable for IA whose accuracy deterioration induces high
false reject rate, rendering the IA system unusable. Furthermore,
existing IA systems leverage computationally expensive machine
learning which can introduce large authentication delay. It is
challenging to improve the authentication accuracy of these
systems without sacrificing authentication delay. In this paper,
we propose a multi-level privilege control (MPC) scheme that
dynamically adjusts users’ access privilege based on their be-
havior change. MPC increases the system’s confidence on users’
legitimacy even when their behaviors deviate from historical data,
thus improving authentication accuracy. It is a lightweight feature
added to the existing IA schemes that helps avoid frequent and
expensive retraining of machine learning models, thus improv-
ing authentication delay. We demonstrate that MPC increases
authentication accuracy by 18.63% and reduces authentication
delay by 7.02 minutes on average, using a public dataset that
contains comprehensive user behavior data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rich behavioral data gathered by various sensors embedded
in smart devices facilitates the implicit authentication of users
based on their behaviors [1]–[3]. In general, IA systems
authenticate a user by matching her real-time behavior to
her historical behavior. Real-time behavior is obtained from
one or more sensors whose data can uniquely characterize
the user and distinguish her from other users, at the time
of authentication. Similarly, historical behavior is obtained
from the same sensors in the past and updated after new
data is collected. IA schemes typically run at the background
and stream data at an appropriate frequency to ensure that
data is sufficiently collected and the battery consumption
is reasonable. As with any other practical security system,
IA systems need to strike a good balance between security
and usability. However, it is highly challenging to achieve
such balance due to the dynamically changing behaviors of
users. On the one hand, we need the system to cope with
a user’s behavior deviation [1], e.g., a change of routine,
and not falsely reject the user (usability). On the other hand,
the system needs to differentiate between a legitimate user’s
changed behavior and other users’ behaviors to prevent falsely
accepting adversaries (security). Balancing between such false
rejects and false accepts improves the authentication accuracy
and is the main focus of this paper.
In addition to false reject rate, another important measure
of system usability is authentication delay. Authentication
delay mainly consists of training delay to obtain historical
behaviors and behavior matching delay, which varies across
different authentication schemes [4] and is closely relevant
to authentication accuracy. The amount and quality of sensor
data collected by the system directly affects the authentication
accuracy. Insufficient data collection can result in an inferior
historical behavior model that is not representative of a user’s
behavior. Low quality data can be caused by noisy behavior
data (due to either a legitimate user’s behavior deviation or
adversaries) or noisy sensor readings. Authentication delay is
typically increased when the system attempts to improve upon
the amount and quality of the collected data since retraining of
the machine learning [5] model and additional data collection
are needed. Balancing between authentication accuracy and
delay is hence another problem this paper is trying to solve to
further enhance usability.
Existing research on IA systems focuses on the effectiveness
of IA schemes, i.e., finding suitable behavioral features such
as touch, typing, and other motions that uniquely identify
users [3], [6]–[13]. Although authentication accuracy and
delay were measured as performance indicators, none of
these papers addressed methods to improve them to make
the system more user-friendly. We argue that this is a rather
important issue to consider since practicality is the key for
IA systems to be widely deployed, and provide our solutions
in this paper. Specifically, we propose a multi-level privilege
control scheme, or MPC, that divides the single privilege level
in current systems into multiple fine-grained privilege levels.
The privilege levels are used to separate apps based on their
level of security so that users can still access the less sensitive
apps on their smart devices even if their behaviors change.
The levels are dynamically adjusted to reflect the user’s
dynamically changing behaviors, and therefore enhancing
the system’s authentication accuracy by balancing between
false rejects and false accepts. It is challenging to find such
a balance because of the difficulty in distinguishing a user’s
deviated behaviors from other users’ behaviors. In other
words, decreased false reject rate may cause increased false
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accept rate, and vice versa. A fine line needs to be drawn
to lower both rates and boost the system’s confidence on
a user’s legitimacy, which requires in-depth analysis of the
existing IA schemes and suitable mathematical modeling.
Main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We propose a multi-level privilege control scheme to
address the usability of IA systems, a key issue the existing
IA schemes are faced with, by improving the authentication
accuracy and delay at the same time. The scheme solves the
core problem of how to set and adjust the user’s privilege
level such that both false reject rate and false accept rate are
decreased, where the problem is modeled by applying physical
laws that describe the motion of bodies under the influence
of a system of forces. To further correct the privilege level
adjustment and improve authentication accuracy, we employ a
two-factor authentication mechanism in which the secondary
factor provides feedback to identify the user’s behavior devi-
ation and filter out noisy sensor readings using Kalman filter.
The scheme does not rely on additional data collection and
adds no authentication delay. The delay is in fact reduced due
to the improve authentication accuracy.
• The proposed MPC can be generally applied to most of
the current IA systems as long as the output (behavior scores)
can be converted to probabilistic values.
• We demonstrate that MPC increases authentication
accuracy by 18.63% and reduces authentication delay by 7.02
minutes on average. The experiments were conducted using a
public dataset that contains comprehensive user behavior data,
as opposed to proprietary datasets, and thus the repeatability
is guaranteed.
II. PRELIMINARY
In this section, we cover background information on support
vector machine (SVM), kernel density estimator, and Kalman
filter. The output of SVM needs to be converted to probabilistic
values for MPC to handle, which will be discussed in Section
III-B. Kernel density estimator will be used in Section III-D
to estimate the occurrence frequency of a particular behavior
score. Kalman filter filters out behavior data and sensor reading
noises and will be elaborated in Section III-D.
A. SVM Classifier
SVM is the most widely adopted technique in IA systems
[3], [5], [7], [14]–[19]. Given a training dataset sampled from
a group of people, SVM outputs a hyperplane located in a high
dimensional space to cluster the data into two classes, the le-
gitimate class and the illegitimate class. During authentication,
new data sampled from the current user is verified according to
its position in the hyperplane. The user is deemed legitimate if
the new data falls in the legitimate class. In the proposed MPC,
we need to calculate the distance between the hyperplane and
the testing result in a high dimensional space which renders
it difficult with SVM’s traditional output. Instead, we utilize
the probability output calculated by fitting a sigmoid function,
1
1+exp(Afi+B)
, to the margins of the SVM [20], where A and
B are the parameters required to estimate and fi indicates the
margins of the SVM output. The probability output of SVM is
called behavior score in this paper. Behavior scores represent
users’ behaviors in numeric form and are used by the system
to deduce users’ legitimacy.
B. Kernel Density Estimator
Kernel density estimator [21]–[23] serves as a tool to
analyze the usage pattern of the IA system, e.g., legitimate
and illegitimate usages in a given time interval, by estimating
how often a given behavior score occurs. This is necessary in
distinguishing between the legitimate user’s deviated behaviors
and other (illegitimate) users’ behaviors. Kernel density esti-
mator divides the interval into small bins with length h, in each
of which it calculates the number of behavior scores that fall
into the bin. A distribution of the behavior scores is obtained
by placing a Gaussian over each score and then adding up
the contributions over the whole dataset. The kernel density
model is p(x) = 1N
∑1
n=1
1
(2pih2)D/2
exp− ||x−xn||22h2 , where D
indicates D − dimensionalspace, N is the total number of
behavior scores, xn is the behavior score and x indicates the
center of each bin.
C. Kalman Filter
Kalman filter [24] is employed in MPC to filter out sensor
noise and help correct behavior deviation. The two types of
noises it assumes, process noise and observation noise, can
be used to model behavior deviation (or behavior noise) and
sensor noise, respectively, making it an excellent tool for
noise filtering in IA systems. In addition, Kalman filter is
loop carried which means it automatically filters out noises at
the time of authentication, instead of the need for more data
to perform the filtering as in the existing literature [7], [14],
[15], [25]–[28]. This property greatly reduces authentication
delay.
III. THE PROPOSED MPC SCHEME
We first provide a high-level overview of our MPC scheme
before diving into technical details.
A. System Overview
Existing IA schemes such as [3], [7] authenticate users by
deriving a behavior score using data samples gathered in a
period of time, called time window (or authentication cycle)
which is a design-specific parameter. This score, , is then
compared with a threshold, e.g., 0.5. If the threshold is passed,
illegitimate usage is indicated and the system will lock the
device. When legitimate and illegitimate users have vastly
different behaviors, existing IA schemes can achieve high
authentication accuracy. However, based on our preliminary
simulation using the Friends and Family Dataset [29], [30],
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more than 70% of users’ behavior data samples overlap and
cannot be separated by simply setting a threshold 1. As an ex-
ample, we randomly selected two participants from the dataset,
one as the legitimate user and the other as the illegitimate
user, and converted their SVM output to probabilistic behavior
scores. The time window is set to 15 seconds. As shown in
Fig. 3 (a) and (b), the legitimate and illegitimate users both
have a large proportion of behavior scores located around the
threshold 0.5 which are inseparable. The behavior overlapping
problem can be exacerbated by mimicry attacks where the
adversary imitates the legitimate user’s behaviors [31]. The
MPC scheme attempts to improve authentication accuracy
even in the presence of this problem, by using the proposed
initial mapping, privilege movement and domain expansion
mechanisms which will be discussed in this section..
The first step of MPC is to obtain multiple privilege levels
using initial mapping. It divides the single privilege level in the
existing IA schemes into multiple privilege levels, where each
level contains a subset of user installed apps. Users rank their
apps based on the apps’ security requirements and map these
apps to the privilege levels. For instance, in a system with
four privilege levels R1 through R4, apps can be mapped to
the levels as shown in Fig. 1. Apps with the highest security
requirements such as banking, e-commerce, health and fitness,
credit score, and password manager are mapped to the highest
privilege level R1. Apps with lower security requirements such
as social media, contacts, games, and utility apps are mapped
to lower levels R2 and R3. R4 is the lowest privilege level
which corresponds to locking the device and thus contains no
app. Note that the number of privilege levels and the security
requirements for the apps are system and user dependent.
Although relevant, it is not the focus of initial mapping which
is a generic method and will not be further discussed. After
obtaining the privilege levels, the system needs to map the user
to a specific level Rc based on the user’s current behavior at the
time of authentication. The level Rc is called the user’s current
level as shown in Fig. 1. This is performed in the second step
of MPC, privilege movement. A user has access to all the apps
contained in Rc and the levels below Rc, but not the apps
in the levels above Rc. Moreover, overlapping behaviors are
effectively separated in this step. Finally, domain expansion
is introduced to dynamically adjust the domain boundaries as
more behavior data become available and filter out behavior
and sensor noises.
An ideal IA scheme should always map the legitimate user
to R1, and illegitimate users to R4. However, as mentioned be-
fore, when the legitimate user’s behavior deviates, it becomes
harder to differentiate it from illegitimate users’ behaviors,
which is why we need more intermediate levels for such
differentiation to avoid locking the legitimate user out imme-
diately. When behavior deviation happens, the legitimate user
may be mapped to lower levels and not able to access high-
privilege apps. To resume her full access privilege, the user can
choose to proactively pass a second-factor authentication, or
1The setting and features of the dataset are same as section IV
passively wait for the system to adjust her privilege in the next
authentication cycle as more data becomes available. The two
methods are captured in the privilege movement and domain
expansion steps. Two-factor authentication has gained increas-
ing popularity and deployment since it enhances security. We
use it in our IA scheme with a twist, i.e., instead of having to
pass the two factors at the same time, the user will be mapped
back to R1 if she passes the second factor authentication. The
reason for such design is that since IA systems are still in
their infancy, understanding their performance limitations is
the most important first step before we can mature their design.
The second factor serves as a feedback mechanism in MPC to
help separate behavior deviation from illegitimate behaviors,
and fundamentally improve the system’s false accept and
false reject rates. Despite that we use password input as
the second factor in this paper, any authentication scheme
other than behavior-based IA can be used. Note that password
input happens only when there is authentication failure in our
system, much less frequently than using password as the main
authentication scheme. After gaining enough insight, we will
be able to enhance our IA scheme without the second factor
in the future.
The majority of current IA research tends to gather their
own data from a small number of volunteers [3], [7], [15], [31],
rendering it difficult to repeat their tests. We use the public
Friends and Family Dataset that contains comprehensive user
behavior data for the presentation and evaluation of our MPC
scheme. Specifically, the dataset contains 130 participants’
8GB data collected in a 5-month period. Data consists of
9 main features: GPS, accelerometer, SMS, app installation,
battery usage, call logs, app usage, blue-tooth devices log,
and Wi-Fi access points. Some of them have many sub-
features, e.g., battery usage includes battery level, plug status,
health and brand information. In our tests, we randomly select
one user as the legitimate user and use other users’ data as
illegitimate behavior data.
R1
R2
R3
R4
RC
Current Privilege Level
Boundary
Fig. 1: The system architecture.
B. Initial Mapping
We mainly discuss applying MPC to SVM-based IA
schemes. For the other IA schemes [1], [7], [32], since their
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output is already a probabilistic behavior score, MPC can be
directly applied.
DEFINITION 1. Let behavior score  ∈ [0, 1] denote the
probabilistic output of SVM approximated by a two-parameter
sigmoid function 11+exp(Afi+B) . In a specific training set
2, we
further divide the interval [0, 1] into n sub-intervals, called
domains, denoted by Dn ⊂ [0, 1]. The legitimate domain is
the largest sub-interval that contains only true accept (TA)
behavior scores. The illegitimate domain is the largest sub-
interval that contains only true reject (TR) behavior scores.
The slack domain is the sub-interval in between the legitimate
domain and illegitimate domain.
The initial mapping mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 2 (a).
The system first initializes the value of parameters α and β by
fitting the sigmoid function to the SVM output trained by data
sampled from legitimate and illegitimate users. The legitimate
and illegitimate domains are predefined based on these two
parameters. Assuming the system has n privilege levels, in
each authentication cycle as new data is collected, SVM takes
the data as input and outputs a new behavior score indicating
the system’s authentication decision. If the new score falls in
the legitimate domain, the system will move the user’s current
privilege level Rc to R1 (if Rc 6= R1) which grants the user
full access. If the new score falls in the illegitimate domain, the
system will lock the device. If the new score falls in the slack
domain, the system will map Rc to one of the observation
levels R2, R3, ..., Rn−1, where the user has only limited
access.
R1 R2 ... Rn
Score:
α β 0 1
Legitimate 
domain
Illegitimate 
domainSlack domain
...
Map:
Observation 
levelsTop level Bottom level
Levels:
(a)
R1 Observation Levels Rn
Current Privilege 
level
-μl +μa 
α β 0 1
Legitimate 
domain
Illegitimate 
domain
RC
Slack domain
Top level Bottom level
(b)
Fig. 2: Initial mapping and Privilege movement. (a) Initial
mapping. (b) Privilege movement.
As shown in Fig. 3 (a) and (b), the legitimate and ille-
gitimate domains are [0, α] and [β, 1], respectively. The
slack domain is located in [α, β], which contains ambiguous
behavior scores that could come from either the legitimate
user or illegitimate users and need separation. In a given
dataset, we can easily find α and β by searching for the largest
and smallest behavior score  derived from the legitimate
2A training set is a dataset that contains various users’ historical behavioral
data.
user’s and illegitimate users’ training data, respectively. In
this subsection and the next, we first assume that α and β
are fixed and focus on the mapping of the current privilege
level Rc to one of the observation levels in the slack domain.
We then release this assumption in Section III-D when we
complete our discussion with the possible movement of the
domain boundaries. Compared to the existing IA schemes,
the initial mapping in MPC balances between security and
usability. Since the system only grants full access to the user
who is most likely to be legitimate, security is enhanced. When
the likelihood declines, instead of completely locking the user
out, the system maps the user to an observation level that
grants lower access rights. It enhances usability if the user
is legitimate while limiting the security breach if the user is
illegitimate. Nevertheless, initial mapping only handles failed
authentications in a more gradual way by adding the slack
domain and observation levels. It does not fundamentally ame-
liorate the false reject (FR) and false accept (FA) performance
which will be the focus of privilege movement and domain
expansion.
C. Privilege Movement
In initial mapping, the current privilege level Rc is mapped
to one of the defined privilege levels [R1, R2, ..., Rn] when a
new behavior score becomes available at the time of authen-
tication and remains in that level until more data comes in.
Such a mapping mechanism does not fundamentally improve
the FR and FA performance since the system still needs a
way to confirm the user’s legitimacy once her behavior score
is mapped to the uncertain observation level. Recall that the
system’s goal is to eventually grant the user full access if she
is legitimate and lock the user out if otherwise. The slack
domain is just a buffer for a more smooth transition. We
introduce privilege movement in the mapping of Rc, where Rc
is moved up (towards R1) or down (towards Rn) gradually out
of the slack domain. We assume it takes the illegitimate users
several tries before being able to impersonate (i.e., imitate the
behavior or guess the password of) the legitimate user. We also
assume that the IA scheme gives high authentication accuracy,
i.e., the legitimate and illegitimate users’ behavior scores
fall into their corresponding domains rather than the slack
domain, when the scheme is newly trained. Authentication
accuracy will gradually decline as more behavior data becomes
available from either the legitimate user or illegitimate users
after training. Retraining of the IA scheme may be needed
which is covered in detail in [5].
We summarize the privilege movement mechanism in Fig.
2 (b). The system keeps track of the user’s behaviors and
once it observes a behavior score that falls into the slack
domain, it searches through the previous scores to find a more
definitive answer. If there were scores in the legitimate domain,
the system leans towards regarding the user as legitimate and
moves Rc upward with distance −µl at the end of the current
authentication cycle. This process is repeated until Rc reaches
R1. However, if the system observes a behavior score that falls
into the illegitimate domain instead, Rc is moved downward
4
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Legitimate
=0.5379
(a)
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Illegitimate
 =0.2884
(b)
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
1
2
3
4
5
Ti
m
e 
slo
t (h
ou
r)
Legitimate
(c)
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
1
2
3
4
5
Ti
m
e 
slo
t (h
ou
r)
Illegitimate
(d)
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Se
qu
en
ce
 o
f t
im
e 
w
in
do
w
Legitimate
Illegitimate
(e)
Fig. 3: Behavior scores of (a) the legitimate user, (b) the illegitimate users, (c) the legitimate user in a 5-hour period, (d) the
illegitimate users in a 5-hour period, and (e) both users in 10 time windows.
with distance +µa at the end of the current authentication
cycle. This process is repeated until Rc reaches Rn. Similarly,
if there were scores in the illegitimate domain, the system
leans towards regarding the user as illegitimate and moves
Rc downward with distance +µa at the end of the current
authentication cycle. This process is repeated until Rc reaches
Rn. However, if the system observes a behavior score that
falls into the legitimate domain instead, Rc is moved upward
with distance −µl at the end of the current authentication
cycle. This process is repeated until Rc reaches R1. If Rc
falls in between privilege levels, the user is assumed access
privilege of the lower level. The movement distances −µl and
+µa are design parameters that can be constants or variables.
For the discussion in this subsection, we let µl = l/2 and
µa = l where l is the fixed distance between privilege levels.
The system is thus less tolerable and more restrictive when
there is evidence that the current user is illegitimate. It is also
more conservative in giving the user higher access privilege
when the user’s legitimacy was confirmed in the past but is
currently in doubt. Such design is to enhance security while
not sacrificing usability. Moreover, the FR and FA performance
is improved since the system always tries to move Rc out of
the slack domain based on evidence. The privilege movement
mechanism has O(1) time complexity, which renders the
authentication delay the same as the IA schemes without MPC.
In the next subsection, we discuss making µl and µa variables
to improve authentication accuracy.
As an example, the behavior score distribution for the
legitimate user and illegitimate user is shown in Fig. 3 (c) and
(d), respectively, using the aforementioned simulation with two
participants. The scores are grouped into five one-hour time
slots, where each time slot contains multiple time windows.
In each time slot, there are behavior scores belonging to
the legitimate/illegitimate domain that co-occur with scores
belonging to the slack domain. The scores that belong to
the legitimate/illegitimate domain are used as evidence and
guidance to move the scores in the slack domain. When
behavior deviation happens, initial mapping may map the
legitimate user to the observation level and still cause false
rejects which are corrected with privilege movement. The same
is true for false accepts. In addition, we randomly selected a
time slot from Fig. 3 (c) and (d), and magnified it in Fig.
3 (e) where the threshold Ω is predefined to best separate
the two users. For the ease of presentation, we assume that
there is only one observation level and three privilege levels
in total. In the first time window, the legitimate user’s behavior
score falls in the legitimate domain (shown in the figure) but
her Rc has not reached R1 (not shown in the figure). The
system therefore moves Rc upward for l/2. In the second
through fourth time window, the score falls in the legitimate
domain again but Rc has reached R1. So Rc remains in R1.
In the fifth through tenth time window, Rc falls in the slack
domain. Since the system observed four behavior scores in the
legitimate domain, Rc remains in R1. If the system observed
scores in the illegitimate domain instead, Rc would have been
moved towards Rn. The illegitimate user in Fig. 3 (e) follows
a similar privilege movement process. Using the Friend and
Family Dataset, we were able to observe the co-occurrence
of legitimate/illegitimate-domain behavior scores and slack-
domain behavior scores for the same user in a reasonably
short period of time (2-3 minutes), in all the two-participant
simulations we conducted. There may be cases in reality where
a user’s behavior score stays in the slack domain for a very
long time without further evidence. We do not investigate this
problem in this paper due to the lack of data and will leave it
as our future work.
The effectiveness of privilege movement is highly dependent
on the size of the legitimate and illegitimate domains. If α
and β are fixed, they may become less indicative as more
behavior data from either the legitimate user or illegitimate
users become available. This problem will be coped with in the
domain expansion mechanism where the size of the domains
is dynamically adjusted to reflect the behavior change and
improve the authentication accuracy.
D. Domain Expansion
We introduce domain expansion in which the domain
boundaries α and β are updated. In practice, due to behavior
deviation and sensor noise, the initial setting of α and β may
become inaccurate. If behavior scores from the legitimate user
keep falling in the slack domain, it may indicate that the
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legitimate domain is too small and needs to be expanded to
reduce false rejects. Similarly, the illegitimate domain may
need to be expanded to reduce false accepts. Authentication
accuracy is improved as a result. As shown in Fig. 4, the
original legitimate and illegitimate domains are [0, α] and
[β, 1], respectively. The new domains become [0, α′] and
[β′, 1] after expansion. In addition, authentication delay is
reduced since less privilege movement is needed and the
system can make decisions more quickly. In a given dataset,
it is straightforward to find out whether the behavior scores
that keep falling in the slack domain belong to the legitimate
user. In reality however, it is difficult for the system to
know in which case the second-factor authentication (password
input for our discussion) is needed to provide feedback, as
previously mentioned. We assume that the legitimate user will
input the correct password and illegitimate users will input
wrong passwords.
We model domain expansion by applying physical laws that
describe the motion of bodies under the influence of a system
of forces. Specifically, the expansion S in time t is defined as:
S =
1
2
(a− aˆ)t2 + v0t, (1)
where a denotes the acceleration of the expansion, t denotes
the number of time windows or authentication cycles, v0
denotes the initial velocity of the expansion, and aˆ is the
resistance that slows down or stops the expansion. Every time
the user inputs the correct password and the behavior score
is outside of the legitimate domain, the system will expand
the legitimate domain to contain the behavior score where the
expansion is proportional to the distance between the behavior
score and legitimate domain ( − α). However, if the system
observes frequent password input, it is an indication that the
current machine learning model in the IA scheme is no longer
suitable and needs to be retrained [5].
α β 0 1
Legitimate 
domain
Illegitimate 
domain
Slack domain
β 'α'...
R1 R2 Rn
Correct password
Wrong password
Levels:
Score:
Fig. 4: Domain expansion.
The acceleration of the expansion a is defined as:
a =
Rd ∗ ε
W1
+W2 + δ, (2)
where W1 =
∑
i
n
(i)
l
+n(i)a∑
i
N(i)
is a balancing parameter that
controls the expansion, W2 is a constant representing the
initial acceleration,
∑
i n
(i)
l is the number of times the user
inputs the correct password when her score is in the slack
domain,
∑
i n
(i)
a is the number of times the user inputs a wrong
password when her score is in the slack domain,
∑
iN
(i) is
the total number of authentication cycles, Rd is the distance
between Rc and R1, ε =  − α is the distance between the
behavior score and legitimate domain, and δ is the mixture of
behavior noise and sensor noise.
The expansion of the legitimate domain may result in the
inclusion of illegitimate users’ behavior scores that originally
fall in the slack domain. To reduce such false accepts, we
introduce the resistance aˆ that constrains the expansion:
aˆ = a(
∫ α
0
p(εa)dεa + θ), (3)
where θ is a constant that prevents α from surpassing β,∫ α
0
p(εa)dεa denotes the probability that the legitimate domain
contains behavior scores derived from illegitimate users in
the training set, and εa denotes the behavior score derived
from illegitimate users’ data in the training set.
∫ α
0
p(εa)dεa
be estimated using kernel density estimator.
Substituting (3) into (1) and assuming t = 1, we have
S =
1
2
a(1−
∫ α
0
p(εa)dεa − θ) + v0, (4)
where V = 1− ∫ α
0
p(εa)dεa− θ controls when the expansion
stops.
Substituting 2 into 4, we have
S =
1
2
(
Rd ∗ ε
W1
+W2)V + v0 + ∆, (5)
where ∆ = V ∗δ2 is estimated and eliminated using Kalman
filter.
In each authentication cycle, if the user inputs the correct
password, the predicted state estimate xk|k−1 which controls
the expansion of the legitimate domain is defined as: xk|k−1 =
Fkxk−1|k−1 + Bkuk, where Fk =
[
1 t
0 1
]
, Bk =
[
t2
2
t
]
and
uk = (
Rd∗εa
W1
+ W2)V . The predicted estimate covariance
Pk|k−1 is defined as: Pk|k−1 = FkPk−1|k−1FTk +Qk, where
the process noise covariance is Qk =
 t44 t32
t3
2 t
2
 ∗ σ2a with σa
being the magnitude of the process noise (behavior noise).
The innovation covariance is Sk = HkPk|k−1HTk + Rk,
where Hk =
[
1
0
]
andRk is the covariance of the observation
noise (sensor noise). Kalman gain is calculate as: Kk =
Pk|k−1HTk S
−1
k . Since Kalman filter is loop carried, we update
the state estimate and associate covariance at the end of each
authentication cycle as: xk|k = xk|k−1 +Kk(zk−Hkxk|k−1),
and Pk|k = (I − KkHk)Pk|k−1. We calculate the expansion
as Pk|kHk and need to rescale it before applying it to real
systems.
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If the user inputs a wrong password, we let uk = εlRd∗W1 +
W2 and a similar process happens for the expansion of the
illegitimate domain. The illegitimate domain expansion is
covered in detail in the full version of this paper [33].
In addition to causing false accepts, the expansion of the
legitimate domain also affects privilege movement, or more
specifically, the distance of the movement −µl and +µa.
Now that the domain boundaries α and β are dynamically
adjustable, the distance of the movement needs to be adjusted
accordingly. We let −µl = −µl
∫ α
0
p(εl)dεl∫ α
0
p(εa)dεa
and +µa =
+µa
∫ 1
β
p(εa)dεa∫ 1
β
p(εl)dεl
, where εl and εa denote the behavior scores
derived from the legitimate user’s and illegitimate users’ data
in the training set, respectively,
∫ α
0
p(εl)dεl and
∫ α
0
p(εa)dεa
denote the probabilities that the legitimate domain contains
behavior scores derived from the legitimate user’s and il-
legitimate users’ data in the training set, respectively, and∫ 1
β
p(εl)dεl and
∫ 1
β
p(εa)dεa denote the probabilities that the
illegitimate domain contains behavior scores derived from the
legitimate user’s and illegitimate users’ data in the training
set, respectively. If the ratio
∫ α
0
p(εl)dεl∫ α
0
p(εa)dεa
is large, it indicates
that the legitimate user’s behavior scores still dominate the
legitimate domain, and the distance of the privilege movement
is appropriate. Otherwise, the distance needs to be adjusted.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have conducted comprehensive performance evaluation
on a four-level MPC scheme that contains a top level, two
observation levels and a bottom level. Most of the simulations
use data from all 130 participants in 5 months, where we
randomly select one participant as the legitimate user and mix
her data with the data sampled from all other participants.
The simulations are performed 130 times for each participant
against all the other participants and averaged results are
derived for each test. We keep the illegitimate users’ data
portion in the range of 50% to 80% to simulate a more
hostile environment. Features used in the evaluation include
GPS, app installation, Bluetooth and battery usage. GPS
contains longitude and latitude. App installation contains app
package, installed apps, uninstalled apps, running apps and
their corresponding class names. Bluetooth usage contains the
participants’ IDs, address and duration. Battery usage contains
health percentage, battery level, voltage, plug information and
brand information.
A. Authentication Accuracy
The time window is set to 15 seconds which contains 1
KB user data. The data is sent to SVM for training and the
output is converted to probabilities. To simulate real usage,
we divide the whole dataset into 100 distinct subsets sorted
based on time, and perform tests by gradually sending the
subsets to the system. We use 5-fold cross validation in the
training and testing. The parameters for SVM, including the
separation threshold, are chosen to minimize false rejects and
false accepts. Finally, we evaluate the average authentication
accuracy in each time window for both MPC (applied to
IA) and the traditional IA among all users. We use SVM
with separation threshold Ω for the traditional IA. The results
are shown in Fig. 5. In Fig. 5 (a), the accuracies for both
MPC and the traditional IA have some fluctuations in the
first five subsets and become stable in the remaining subsets.
The accuracy fluctuations of the traditional IA is larger than
MPC due to behavior deviation and sensor noise that are left
untreated. The accuracy improvement in MPC is obvious and
stable across the all the subsets. In addition, we calculate
MPC’s accuracy across all the subsets, which on average
achieves 18.63% improvement compared with the traditional
IA.
Fig. 5 (b) provides a more detailed view of accuracy
improvement in the four features. The improvement in GPS is
the highest due to the traditional IA’s low accuracy using the
GPS feature. Similarly, the improvement in app installation
is the lowest. The accuracy improvement for MPC is not
stable during the first few authentications because of domain
expansion. It becomes stable after the 70th subset for all four
features. Generally, the accuracy improvement after applying
MPC is between 0.04% to 0.35%.
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Fig. 5: Authentication accuracy. (a) Average accuracy for both
MPC and the traditional IA. (b) Accuracy improvement for all
four features with MPC.
B. Authentication Delay
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Fig. 6: Authentication delay. (a) Average delay reduction for
all users. (b) Delay reduction for 18 randomly selected users.
We calculate the authentication delay for both MPC and
the traditional IA when they reach their corresponding highest
accuracy, i.e., 99% and 82% on average, shown in Fig. 6. The
average authentication delay reductions for the four features
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with MPC are shown in Fig. 6 (a). For the app installation
feature, MPC gives the lowest delay reduction since the
traditional IA trained by the app data already achieves a good
delay performance and there is little room for improvement.
Similarly, for the Bluetooth feature, MPC provides the highest
delay reduction. In addition, we calculate the overall delay
among all features with MPC, which on average achieves a
reduction of 7.02 minutes.
Moreover, we calculate the amount of time reduction for
each user in MPC when it reaches the highest accuracy, by
randomly selecting 18 users, as shown in Fig. 6 (b). We cluster
the results based on the features. Users are marked by different
colors and the corresponding delay reduction is shown in the
y-axis. It is observed from the results that the delay reduction
varies greatly among users and even for the same user, which
reflects the complexity of human behaviors.
C. Performance under Long-term Usage
We evaluate the performance of MPC under long-term usage
using data from 19 randomly selected users in three time slots
containing 200, 300, and 500 time windows. We calculate the
accuracy (ACC), precision (PREC), true accept rate (TAR),
true reject rate (TRR), false accept rate (FAR) and false reject
rate (FRR) in Table I for both MPC and the traditional IA.
As shown in Table I, the performance improvement with
MPC is significant compared with the traditional IA. Another
important observation is that the performance of the traditional
IA does not monotonically increase with time. In the other
words, the authentication accuracy of the traditional IA does
not always improve as we gather more behavior data. This
is due to behavior deviation and sensor noise. MPC, on the
other hand, is much more predictable in terms of improving
the authentication accuracy since it automatically corrects
behavior deviation and filters out noise in each authentication
cycle.
Furthermore, as shown in Table I, MPC’s accuracy improve-
ment becomes smaller between the 300 and 500 time windows,
compared with between the 200 and 300 time windows. As
discussed previously, MPC reduces the impact of overlapping
behavior scores in the slack domain using initial mapping,
privilege movement and domain expansion. Since it is loop
carried, the accuracy improvement is reflected gradually in
each time window and the expansion becomes slower and
more stable with time.
D. Other Performance Measures
We calculate the percentage of behavior scores that are
mapped to each privilege level in MPC, for the legitimate
user and illegitimate users. As shown in Fig. 7 (a), less than
3% of the behavior scores are mapped to the observation
levels, which indicates that MPC is fast and highly effective
in making the final decision. The number of behavior scores
which fall in the observation levels, level 2 and level 3, is
almost identical.
We also calculate the behavior score distributions in each
privilege level for time windows 10 through 70 as shown in
TABLE I: Performance evaluation under long-term usage.
Traditional IA (±1.0)
Time* ACC % PREC % TAR % TRR % FAR % FRR %
200 87.58 92.04 89.18 69.38 30.62 10.82
300 84.40 87.77 87.08 67.84 32.16 12.92
500 83.16 86.90 84.62 66.77 33.23 15.38
MPC (±1.0)
200 97.26 97.40 98.80 93.52 6.48 1.20
300 98.64 98.87 98.93 98.18 1.82 1.07
500 98.97 99.08 99.15 98.72 1.28 0.85
*Time stands for time window. ACC = TA+TR
TA+TR+FA+FR
, PREC =
TA
TA+FA
, TAR = TA
TA+FR
, TRR = TR
TR+FA
, FAR = FA
FA+TR
and
FRR = FR
FR+TA
.
Fig. 7 (b). The z-axis indicates the number of behavior scores.
The y-axis indicates the time windows. The x-axis indicates
the privilege levels, where the left four levels are plotted from
the legitimate user’s behavior scores and the right four levels
are plotted from illegitimate users. For both users, the number
of scores which fall in the observation levels is small, less than
10, which is similar to the result in Fig. 7 (a). The proportion
of the behavior scores in the top and bottom privilege levels
is different from Fig. 7 (a), since Fig. 7 (b) only considers
limited time windows while Fig. 7 (a) considers data spanning
5 months.
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Fig. 7: The proportion of behavior scores in each level.
(a) Average proportion. (b) Proportion in time windows 10
through 70.
V. RELATED WORK
The majority of the existing work [3], [6]–[9], [11], [12]
focuses on finding suitable behavioral features such as touch,
typing, and other motions that uniquely identify users, ignoring
the usability of the IA systems. The amount of data gathered
by various sensors directly affects the accuracy of IA systems
[1]–[3]. By increasing the time spent in collecting users’
behavior data, the accuracy of IA can be improved [2], [3].
However, this approach will also increase the authentication
delay and undermine usability. In this paper, we proposed a
multi-level privilege control scheme to address the usability of
IA systems by improving authentication accuracy and delay.
8
To deal with the behavior and sensor noises, most of the
existing IA schemes use simple approaches such as resampling
[3], averaging the results [7], or no approach at all [15],
[17], [34]. Such noises will degrade system performance in
terms of authentication accuracy and delay. The problem will
be exacerbated as the size of the behavior data grows. We
applied Kalman filter [35] to correct behavior deviation and
filter out sensor noise during the authentication. We showed
that Kalman filter is naturally suitable for IA and can be
implemented in practice to further improve authentication
accuracy while reducing authentication delay.
The existing IA systems are evaluated using private datasets
collected from their volunteers [3], [7], [14], [31]. Such
datasets may not be sharable due to the sensitivity of human
behavior data. It is hence difficult to recreate their experiments,
compare with their schemes, or use their datasets for future
research. Our proposed MPC is evaluated using a public and
comprehensive dataset [29], [30]. The repeatability of our
experiments and fair comparisons are guaranteed.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a multi-level privilege control
scheme, MPC, to enhance the usability of IA systems. We
evaluated MPC using a public dataset, which on average
achieves 18.63% accuracy improvement and 7.02-minute
authentication delay reduction. MPC is a lightweight solution
that can be generally applied to IA schemes whose output
can be converted to probabilistic values. As our future work,
we plan to incorporate MPC into other non-SVM-based IA
schemes and deploy our MPC-based IA system for use by
recruiting volunteers.
REFERENCES
[1] Y. Yang, J. Sun, and L. Guo, “Personaia: A lightweight implicit
authentication system based on customized user behavior selection,”
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2016.
[2] E. Shi, Y. Niu, M. Jakobsson, and R. Chow, “Implicit authentication
through learning user behavior,” in Information Security, 2011.
[3] W.-H. Lee and R. B. Lee, “Multi-sensor authentication to improve
smartphone security,” in Conference on Information Systems Security
and Privacy, 2015.
[4] H. Khan, A. Atwater, and U. Hengartner, “A comparative evaluation of
implicit authentication schemes,” in International Workshop on Recent
Advances in Intrusion Detection. Springer, 2014, pp. 255–275.
[5] Y. Yang, J. Sun, and P. Li, “Model retraining and dynamic privilege-
based access control for implicit authentication systems,” in IEEE In-
ternational Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems (MASS).
ACM, 2015.
[6] J. Sun, R. Zhang, J. Zhang, and Y. Zhang, “Touchin: Sightless two-
factor authentication on multi-touch mobile devices,” in CNS, 2014 IEEE
Conference on. IEEE, 2014, pp. 436–444.
[7] C. Bo, L. Zhang, X.-Y. Li, Q. Huang, and Y. Wang, “Silentsense: silent
user identification via touch and movement behavioral biometrics,” in
Proceedings of the 19th annual international conference on Mobile
computing & networking. ACM, 2013, pp. 187–190.
[8] T. Feng, J. Yang, Z. Yan, E. M. Tapia, and W. Shi, “Tips: Context-aware
implicit user identification using touch screen in uncontrolled environ-
ments,” in Proceedings of the 15th Workshop on Mobile Computing
Systems and Applications. ACM, 2014, p. 9.
[9] W. Shi, F. Yang, Y. Jiang, F. Yang, and Y. Xiong, “Senguard: Passive user
identification on smartphones using multiple sensors,” in Wireless and
Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications (WiMob), 2011
IEEE 7th International Conference on. IEEE, 2011, pp. 141–148.
[10] J. Gurary, Y. Zhu, N. Alnahash, and H. Fu, “Implicit authentication for
mobile devices using typing behavior,” in International Conference on
Human Aspects of Information Security, Privacy, and Trust. Springer,
2016, pp. 25–36.
[11] M. Shahzad, A. X. Liu, and A. Samuel, “Secure unlocking of mobile
touch screen devices by simple gestures: You can see it but you can not
do it,” in Proceedings of the 19th annual international conference on
Mobile computing & networking. ACM, 2013, pp. 39–50.
[12] C. Castelluccia, M. Duermuth, M. Golla, and F. Deniz, “Towards im-
plicit visual memory-based authentication,” in Network and Distributed
System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2017.
[13] M. Tamviruzzaman, S. I. Ahamed, C. S. Hasan, and C. O’brien, “epet:
when cellular phone learns to recognize its owner,” in Proceedings of
the 2nd ACM workshop on Assurable and usable security configuration.
ACM, 2009, pp. 13–18.
[14] M. Frank, R. Biedert, E.-D. Ma, I. Martinovic, and D. Song, “Touchalyt-
ics: On the applicability of touchscreen input as a behavioral biometric
for continuous authentication,” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 136–148, 2013.
[15] L. Li, X. Zhao, and G. Xue, “Unobservable re-authentication for
smartphones.” in NDSS, 2013, pp. 1–16.
[16] C. Bo, L. Zhang, T. Jung, J. Han, X.-Y. Li, and Y. Wang, “Continuous
user identification via touch and movement behavioral biometrics,” in
Performance Computing and Communications Conference (IPCCC),
2014 IEEE International. IEEE, 2014, pp. 1–8.
[17] H. Khan, A. Atwater, and U. Hengartner, “Itus: an implicit authentication
framework for android,” in Proceedings of the 20th annual international
conference on Mobile computing and networking. ACM, 2014, pp.
507–518.
[18] H. Gascon, S. Uellenbeck, C. Wolf, and K. Rieck, “Continuous authen-
tication on mobile devices by analysis of typing motion behavior.” in
Sicherheit. Citeseer, 2014, pp. 1–12.
[19] A. Alzubaidi and J. Kalita, “Authentication of smartphone users using
behavioral biometrics,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials,
vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 1998–2026, 2016.
[20] J. Platt et al., “Probabilistic outputs for support vector machines and
comparisons to regularized likelihood methods,” Advances in large
margin classifiers, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 61–74, 1999.
[21] D. W. Scott, “Kernel density estimators,” Multivariate Density Estima-
tion: Theory, Practice, and Visualization, pp. 125–193, 2008.
[22] F. Measure, “Kernel density estimator.”
[23] C. M. Bishop, “Pattern recognition,” Machine Learning, vol. 128, pp.
1–58, 2006.
[24] R. E. Kalman, “A new approach to linear filtering and prediction
problems,” Transactions of the ASME–Journal of Basic Engineering,
vol. 82, no. Series D, pp. 35–45, 1960.
[25] M. Abramson and D. W. Aha, “User authentication from web browsing
behavior,” DTIC Document, Tech. Rep. 12-121-4465, 2013.
[26] B. Draffin, J. Zhu, and J. Zhang, “Keysens: Passive user authentication
through micro-behavior modeling of soft keyboard interaction,” in Inter-
national Conference on Mobile Computing, Applications, and Services.
Springer, 2013, pp. 184–201.
[27] W.-H. Lee and R. B. Lee, “Implicit authentication for smartphone
security,” in International Conference on Information Systems Security
and Privacy. Springer, 2015, pp. 160–176.
[28] W. Wang, A. X. Liu, M. Shahzad, K. Ling, and S. Lu, “Understanding
and modeling of wifi signal based human activity recognition,” in
Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Conference on Mobile
Computing and Networking. ACM, 2015, pp. 65–76.
[29] “Friends and family dataset - publications and findings,” 2014. [Online].
Available: http://realitycommons.media.mit.edu/friendsdataset3.html
[30] N. Aharony, W. Pan, C. Ip, I. Khayal, and A. Pentland, “Social
fmri: Investigating and shaping social mechanisms in the real world,”
Pervasive and Mobile Computing, vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 643–659, 2011.
[31] H. Khan, U. Hengartner, and D. Vogel, “Targeted mimicry attacks on
touch input based implicit authentication schemes,” in Proceedings of the
14th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications,
and Services. ACM, 2016, pp. 387–398.
9
[32] M. Jakobsson, E. Shi, P. Golle, and R. Chow, “Implicit authentication
for mobile devices,” in Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on
Hot topics in security, 2009.
[33] “Dynamic multi-level privilege control in behavior-based implicit
authentication systems leveraging mobile devices,” 2017. [Online].
Available: https://1drv.ms/b/s!ArOYpiu-LnBbbNgL0TS7LCDu5aI
[34] M. K. Kate, M. J. Hake, M. S. Ahire, and M. H. Shelke, “Authentication
of smartphone users using behavioral biometrics and opass technique,”
International Journal, vol. 2, no. 1, 2017.
[35] G. Welch and G. Bishop, “An introduction to the kalman filter,” 1995.
10
